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Abstract — Hiding information in network traffic may lead to 
leakage of confidential information. In this paper we introduce 
a new steganographic system: the PadSteg (Padding 
Steganography). To authors’ best knowledge it is the first 
information hiding solution which represents inter-protocol 
steganography i.e. usage of relation between two or more 
protocols from the TCP/IP stack to enable secret 
communication. PadSteg utilizes ARP and TCP protocols 
together with an Etherleak vulnerability (improper Ethernet 
frame padding) to facilitate secret communication for hidden 
groups in LANs (Local Area Networks). Basing on real 
network traces we confirm that PadSteg is feasible in today’s 
networks and we estimate what steganographic bandwidth is 
achievable while limiting the chance of disclosure. We also 
point at possible countermeasures against PadSteg.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Network steganography is currently seen as a rising 
threat to network security. Contrary to typical steganographic 
methods which utilize digital media (pictures, audio and 
video files) as a cover for hidden data (steganogram), 
network steganography utilizes communication protocols’ 
control elements and their basic intrinsic functionality. As a 
result, such methods may be harder to detect and eliminate. 
In order to minimize the potential threat to public 
security, identification of such methods is important as is the 
development of effective detection (steganalysis) methods. 
This requires both an in-depth understanding of the 
functionality of network protocols and the ways in which it 
can be used for steganography. Many methods had been 
proposed and analyzed so far – for the detailed review see 
Zander et al. [2] or Petitcolas et al. [3]. 
Typical network steganography method uses 
modification of a single network protocol. The classification 
of so such methods was introduced by Mazurczyk et al. in 
[15]. The protocol modification may be applied to the PDU 
(Protocol Data Unit) [1], [4], [5], time relations between 
exchanged PDUs [6], or both [14] (hybrid methods). This 
kind of network steganography can be called intra-protocol 
steganography. 
As far as the authors are aware, PadSteg (Padding 
Steganography), presented in this paper, is the first 
steganographic system that utilizes what we have defined as 
inter-protocol steganography i.e. usage of relation between 
two or more different network protocols to enable secret 
communication – PadSteg utilizes Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), 
ARP, TCP and other protocols. This paper is an extension of 
the work introduced in [16]. 
Thus, classification introduced above may be further 
expanded to incorporate inter-protocol steganographic 
methods (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Network steganography classification 
 
ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) [10] is a simple 
protocol which operates between the data link and network 
layers of the OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) model. In 
IP networks it is used mainly to determine the hardware 
MAC (Media Access Control) address when only a network 
protocol address (IP address) is known. ARP is vital for 
proper functioning of any switched LAN (Local Area 
Network) although it can raise security concerns e.g. it may 
be used to launch an ARP Poisoning attack. 
In Ethernet, frame length is limited to a minimum of 64 
octets, due to the CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/ 
Collision Detection) mechanism, and a maximum of 1500 
octets. Therefore, any frames whose length is less than 64 
octets have to be padded with additional data. The minimal 
size of an Ethernet data field is 46 octets and can be filled 
with data originating from any upper layer protocol, without 
encapsulation via the LLC (Link Layer Control), because 
LLC (with its 8 octets header) is very rarely utilized in 802.3 
networks.  
However, due to ambiguous standardization (RFC 894 
and RFC 1042), implementations of padding mechanism in 
current NICs (Network Interface Cards) drivers vary. 
Moreover, some drivers handle frame padding incorrectly 
and fail to fill it with zeros. As a result of memory leakage, 
Ethernet frame padding may contain portions of kernel 
memory. This vulnerability is discussed in Atstake report and 
is called Etherleak [9]. Data inserted in padding by Etherleak 
is considered unlikely to contain any valuable information; 
therefore it does not pose serious threat to network security 
as such. However, it creates a perfect candidate for a carrier 
of the steganograms, thus it may be used to compromise 
network defenses. Utilization of padding in Ethernet frames 
for steganographic purposes was originally proposed by 
Wolf [13]. If every frame has padding set to zeros (as stated 
in standard), its usage will be easy to detect. With the aid of 
Etherleak, this information hiding scheme may become 
feasible as it will be hard to distinguish frames affected by 
Etherleak from those with steganogram. 
In this paper we propose a new steganographic system 
PadSteg, which can be used in LANs and utilizes ARP and 
other protocols (like TCP or ICMP) together with an 
Etherleak vulnerability. We conduct a feasibility study for 
this information hiding system, taking into account the 
nature of todays’ networks. We also suggest possible 
countermeasures against PadSteg. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the Etherleak vulnerability and related work with 
regard to the application of padding for steganographic 
purposes. Section 3 includes a description of PadSteg 
components. Section 4 presents experimental results for real-
life LAN traffic which permit for an evaluation of feasibility 
of the proposed solution. Section 5 discusses possible 
methods of detection and/or elimination of the proposed 
information hiding system. Finally, Section 6 concludes our 
work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. The Etherleak vulnerability 
The aforementioned ambiguities within the 
standardization cause differences in implementation of the 
padding in Ethernet frames. Some systems have an 
implemented padding operation inside the NIC hardware (so 
called auto padding), others have it in the software device 
drivers or even in a separate layer 2 stack.  
In the Etherleak report Arkin and Anderson [9] 
presented in details an Ethernet frame padding information 
leakage problem. They also listed almost 50 device drivers 
from Linux 2.4.18 kernel that are vulnerable. 
Due to the inconsistency of padding content of short 
Ethernet frames (its bits should be set to zero but in many 
cases they are not), information hiding possibilities arise. 
That is why it is possible to use the padding bits as a carrier 
of steganograms. 
Since Arkin and Anderson’s report dates back to 2003, 
we performed an experiment in order to verify whether 
Etherleak is an issue in today’s networks. The achieved 
results confirmed that many NICs are still vulnerable (see 
experimental results in Section 4).  
 
B. Data hiding using padding 
Padding can be found at any layer of the OSI RM, but 
typically it is exploited for covert communications only in 
the data link, network and transport layers. 
Wolf in [13], proposed a steganographic method which 
utilizes padding of 802.3 frames. Its achievable 
steganographic bandwidth is up to 45 bytes/frame.  
Fisk et al. [7] presented padding of the IP and TCP 
headers in the context of active wardens. Each of these fields 
offers up to 31 bits/packet for steganographic 
communication. 
Padding of IPv6 packets for information hiding was 
described by Lucena et al. in [8] and offers a couple of 
channels with a steganographic bandwidth up to 256 
bytes/packet. 
 
III. IMPROPER ETHERNET FRAME PADDING IN REAL-LIFE 
NETWORKS  
Real network traffic was captured to verify whether 
described in 2003 Etherleak vulnerability is still feasible in 
current LANs. It will also be used to evaluate the proposed 
in Section IV steganographic system – its steganographic 
bandwidth and detectability.  
The experiment was conducted at the Institute of 
Telecommunications at Warsaw University of Technology 
between 15 and 19 of March 2010 (from Monday to Friday). 
It resulted in about 37 million packets captured, which 
corresponds, daily, to 7.43 million frames on average (with 
a standard deviation 1.2 million frames) – for details see 
Table 1. The traffic was captured with the aid of Dumpcap 
which is part of the Wireshark sniffer ver. 1.3.3 
(www.wireshark.org). The sources of traffic were ordinary 
computer devices placed in several university laboratories 
and employees’ ones but also peripherals, servers and 
network equipment. To analyze the captured traffic and 
calculate statistics TShark (which is also part of Wireshark) 
was utilized. Statistics were calculated per day, and average 
results are presented.  
TABLE I.  THE NUMBER OF CAPTURED FRAMES PER DAY 
 
The captured traffic classification by upper layer protocol 
is presented in Fig. 2. Three quarters of the traffic was 
HTTP. Together with SSH, UDP and SSL protocols it sums 
up to about 93% of the traffic. 
 
 
Figure 2. Captured traffic characteristics 
 
Date Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
No. of 
frames 7,205,904 7,027,170 5,761,723 8,241,832 8,945,403 
Almost 22% (with a standard deviation of 7.7%) of all 
daily traffic had padding bits added (~8 million frames). It is 
obvious that not all of the frames were affected since 
padding is added only to small-sized packets.  
 
Table 2 shows for which network protocols frames were 
mostly improperly padded. 
TABLE II.  UPPER LAYER PROTCOLS AFFECTED WITH ETHERNET 
FRAME IMPROPER PADDING IN EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND EXEMPLARY PID 
ASSIGMENT 
 
However, it is important to note, that almost 22% of the 
padded frames experienced improper padding (~1.8 million 
frames). These frames were generated by about 15% of 
hosts in the inspected network (their NICs were produced 
among others by some US leading vendors). We considered 
Ethernet frame padding improper if the padding bits were 
not set to zeros.  
TCP segments with an ACK flag set (which have no 
payload) result in frames that have to be padded, thus, it is 
no surprise that ~93% of improperly padded traffic is TCP. 
Nearly all of this traffic consists of ACK segments. Other 
frames that had improper padding were caused by ARP and 
ICMP messages – Echo Request and Echo Reply (~6.5%). It 
is also worth noting that there is also padding potential in 
UDP datagrams as UDP-based applications often generate 
small-sized frames (e.g. voice packets in IP telephony). 
However, padding was only present in 0.5% of all padded 
frames. 
For PadSteg ARP protocol plays important role (see 
Section IV for details), thus our aim was also to find out 
ARP statistics i.e. what are the most frequently used ARP 
messages, what is their distribution and how many of them 
have improper padding. The results are presented in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Captured ARP characteristics  
 
Not surprisingly, the most frequently sent ARP messages 
were ARP Request (~56.3%) and Reply (~43.4%), while 
Gratuitous ARP messages are in minority (~0.2%). Out of 
all ARP messages almost 20% had improper padding. 
 
IV. COMPONENTS OF THE PROPOSED STEGANOGRAPHIC 
SYSTEM 
PadSteg enables secret communication in a hidden group 
in a LAN environment. In such group, each host willing to 
exchange steganograms should be able to locate and identify 
other hidden hosts. To provide this functionality certain 
mechanisms must be specified. In our proposal, ARP 
protocol, together with improper Ethernet frame padding are 
used to provide localization and identification of the 
members of a hidden group. To exchange steganograms 
improper Ethernet frame padding is utilized in frames that in 
upper layer use TCP, ARP or ICMP (or other network 
protocols that cause Ethernet frames to be padded). These 
protocols will be called carrier-protocols as they enable 
transfer of steganograms throughout the network. 
Moreover, while the secret communication takes place, 
hidden nodes can switch between carrier-protocols to 
minimize the risk of disclosure. We called such mechanism 
carrier-protocol hopping and it will be described in details 
later. 
In this section we first describe ARP protocol, and then 
we focus on proposed steganographic system operations. 
A. Overview of ARP Protocol 
ARP returns the layer 2 (data link) address for a given 
layer 3 address (network layer). This functionality is realized 
with two ARP messages: Request and Reply. The ARP 
header is presented in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. ARP header format  
 
ARP header fields have the following functions: 
• HTYPE (Hardware Type) – type of data link protocol 
used by sender (1 is inserted if it is Ethernet).  
• PTYPE (Protocol Type) – type of network protocol in 
network layer (0800h is inserted if IP is used).  
• HLEN (Hardware Length) – length of hardware 
address fields: SHA, THA (in bytes).  
Affected 
protocol TCP ARP ICMP UDP Others 
[%] 92.82 4.17 2.31 0.54 0.16 
PID 1 2 3 4 - 
• PLEN (Protocol Length) – length of protocol address 
fields: SPA, THA (in bytes).  
• OPER (Operation) – defines, whether the frame is an 
ARP REQUEST (1) or REPLY (2) message.  
• SHA (Sender Hardware Address) – sender data link 
layer address (MAC address for Ethernet). 
• SPA (Sender Protocol Address) – sender network 
layer address. 
• THA (Target Hardware Address) – data link layer 
address of the target. This field contains zeros 
whenever a REQUEST ARP message is sent. 
• TPA (Target Protocol Address) – network layer 
address of the target. This field contains zeros if 
REQUEST ARP message is sent. 
 
An example of ARP communication with Request/Reply 
exchange, captured with the Wireshark sniffer 
(www.wireshark.org), is presented in Fig. 5. First, ARP 
Request is issued (1), which is used by the host with IP 
address 10.7.6.29 to ask other stations (by means of 
broadcast): ‘Who has IP 10.7.56.47?’. In order to send a 
frame intended for everyone in a broadcast domain, Ethernet 
header destination address must be set to 
FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF (2). Next, host with IP address 
10.7.56.47 replies directly to 10.7.6.29 using unicast ARP 
Reply (3) with its MAC address.  
 
 
Figure 5. ARP exchange captured with Wireshark  
 
Basing on the proposed description of ARP protocol, it 
can be concluded that ARP header is rather of fixed content 
and presents little possibilities for information hiding. One 
opportunity is to modulate address fields like it was proposed 
in [11] or [8]. However, this solution provides limited 
steganographic bandwidth if certain level of undetectability 
is to be achieved. Moreover, it may result in improper IP and 
MAC address advertisements which may make this method 
more prone to detection. 
Thus, in the proposed steganographic system PadSteg, 
we utilize ARP Request messages, broadcasted throughout 
LAN, to make other members of the hidden group become 
aware of the presence of a new member. 
 
B. Steganographic system operation 
PadSteg is designed for LANs only because it utilizes 
improper Ethernet frame padding in Ethernet. It allows 
members of the hidden groups to secretly exchange data 
(Fig. 6). 
 
Figure 6. PadSteg hidden group 
 
Every member from the hidden group is obligated to fill 
each short Ethernet frame it sends with non-zero padding to 
make detection harder – such node must mimic Etherleak 
vulnerability. PadSteg also uses protocols like ARP, TCP or 
ICMP to control hidden group and to transfer steganograms.  
PadSteg operation can be split into two phases: 
• Phase I: Advertisement of the hidden node and a 
carrier-protocol. 
• Phase II: Hidden data exchange with optional carrier-
protocol change. 
 
Phase I 
This phase is based on the exchange of ARP Request 
messages with improper Ethernet frame padding (Fig. 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. Hidden node and its carrier-protocol advertisement 
phase 
 
Hidden node that wants to advertise itself to others in the 
group, broadcasts an ARP Request message (1) and inserts 
advertising sequence into the padding bits. It consists of: a 
random number RD (different from 0), and hash RH which is 
calculated based on RD, carrier-protocol identifier PID and 
source MAC address (see eq. 4-1). Incorporating RD ensures 
that frame padding will be random. PID is an identifier of the 
upper layer carrier-protocol for the steganograms transfer 
1 
3 
2 
and may have been assigned exemplary values like in Table 
II. PID is used to advertise hidden node preference for the 
secret data transfer and may be used during steganograms 
exchange by carrier-protocol hopping mechanism.  
An example of the padding bits format (which for ARP is 
144 bits long), assuming usage of MD5 hash function, is 
presented in Fig. 8.  
 
 
Figure 8. Padding format of ARP Request messages for the 
activation phase 
 
All the hidden nodes are obligated to analyze the padding 
of all received ARP Requests. If an ARP Request is received 
with padding that is not all zeros, it is analyzed by extracting 
the random number and calculating corresponding hashes (2) 
as follows 
 
(4−1) 
For each extracted hash, receiver computes hashes with 
different PID. The order of the PID values for hashes 
calculation should correspond to traffic characteristics i.e. 
more likely carrier-protocols should be checked first. For 
example, based on PID values in Table II, RH(1) will be 
computed first, then RH(2) etc. because padding will more 
likely occur for TCP protocol than ARP and others. Such 
approach will limit unnecessary hashes calculation.  Finally, 
if the received and calculated hashes are the same it means 
that a new hidden node is available for steganographic 
exchange and the carrier-protocol for this node is 
established. It means that if any hidden node receives frames 
from this new hidden node, only these corresponding to 
extracted PID value carry steganogram and will be analyzed. 
Each hidden node stores a list of nodes from which it has 
received advertisements with their advertised carrier-
protocol. Every hidden node should also reissue ARP 
Requests at certain time intervals to inform other hidden 
nodes about its existence. To limit the chance of detection, 
sending of ARP Requests may not happen too often (3, 4). In 
ARP, if an entry in host ARP cache is not refreshed within 1 
to 20 minutes (implementation dependent) it expires and is 
removed. Thus, hidden nodes should mimic such behavior to 
imitate the sending of ARP Requests caused by ARP cache 
expiration. 
Adaptation of ARP messages for identification of new 
hidden nodes has two advantages: 
• The broadcast messages will be received by all hosts 
in LAN. 
• The ARP traffic totals to about 0.1% of all traffic (see 
next Section for details), so this choice is also 
beneficial from the performance perspective. Each 
hidden node does not have to analyze all of the 
received traffic but only ARP Requests. 
 
Phase II 
After the identification of a new hidden node and its 
carrier-protocol, other hidden nodes analyze each short 
Ethernet frame’s padding sent from that MAC address that in 
upper layers has chosen carrier-protocol. The received 
frames’ padding contains steganogram bits.  
The bidirectional transmission is performed as presented 
in Fig. 9. Two hidden nodes make e.g. an overt TCP 
connection – they transfer a file (1). During the connection 
TCP ACK segments are issued with improper Ethernet frame 
padding (2 and 4). Received TCP segments are analyzed for 
improper Ethernet padding presence and secret data is 
extracted (3 and 5). For third party observer such 
communication looks like usual data transfer. 
 
 
Figure 9. Hidden group steganograms exchange phase 
 
During the exchange of steganograms or between two 
consecutive connections between two hidden nodes changing 
of carrier-protocol may occur. Hidden nodes may achieve 
this with use of carrier-protocol hopping mechanism. Let 
assume that there are two hidden nodes HN1 and HN2 and 
they want to change their carrier-protocols. To achieve it 
they do as follows (see Fig. 10): 
• When HN1 wants to change its carrier-protocol it 
issues ARP Request which contains different from 
previous PID included in the hash inserted into the 
padding of this frame (see Fig. 8). ARP Request has 
TPA field set to IP address of the HN2 (1). 
• After receiving ARP Request HN2 updates its list of 
hidden nodes and their carrier-protocols based on 
calculated hash analysis and PID (2). Then HN2 
issues ARP Reply directly to HN1, which in padding 
contains its carrier-protocol preference (3). 
• When HN1 receives ARP Reply it updates its list of 
hidden nodes and their carrier-protocols and is ready 
to use different carrier-protocol for HN2 i.e. it will 
analyze padding from all the short frames that in 
upper layers has chosen carrier-protocol (4). 
 
Note that steganogram exchange does not necessarily 
must be symmetrical i.e. hidden nodes do not have to use the 
)_||||()( MACSRRDPIDHPIDRH =
same carrier-protocols which performing hidden data 
transfer. 
 
Figure 10. Carrier-protocol hopping mechanism example 
 
V. PADSTEG EVALUATION 
A. Padding content analysis 
Table III presents hexadecimal values of frame padding, 
written in regular expression standard. Depending on day of 
observation padding contained different values, therefore we 
cannot state which value occurred most or least often. 
However, values bolded did not change in consecutive days. 
Some values were constant and other completely random. 
Therefore, we can make an assumption that padding content 
pattern changes with reboot of the device. Results confirm 
that memory leakage value in padding show some patterns 
that are very difficult to predict. That is why, we suggest 
that the proposed system should sacrifice few bits of the 
padding to generate some pattern in every message in order 
to increase undetectability.  
TABLE III.  FRAME PADDING CONTENT VARIETY (HEXADECIMAL 
VALUES)  
Padding 
Length 
6B 18B 
Regex 
00{2}[0-F]{4} 80fca7a0[0-F]{14} 
80[0-F]{5} a96f[0-F]{16} 
c0[0-F]{5} 00{14} [0-F]{4} 
20{6} [0-F]+00{3}[0-F]* 
474554202f[0-F]{1} 
80fca7a0ffffffffffff[0-
F]{8} 
0101050a74b6 
80fca7a080fe88e0ffffffff0
012179cfd53 
[0-F]{6} (random) [0-F]{18} (random) 
 
B. Steganographic bandwidth estimation 
Let us try to estimate PadSteg steganographic bandwidth 
for a single hidden node transmitting in a hidden group.  
Because, currently, there are no tools for steganography 
detection, in real-life networks, every member of a hidden 
group can exchange almost unlimited number of 
steganograms and remain undiscovered. However, if the 
network traffic is consequently monitored, a naive use of 
PadSteg – that is: excessive generation of Ethernet frames 
with improper padding may be easily detected. 
This leads to conclusion that it is important to evaluate 
what is the realistic steganographic bandwidth under the 
assumption that the secret data exchange will not differ from 
other hosts’ traffic burdened with the Etherleak 
vulnerability. To achieve this goal steganographic user’s 
network activity must mimic behavior of other users in 
terms of sending Ethernet frames with improper padding. 
We calculated the steganographic bandwidth of the 
proposed system based on the average, daily number of 
TCP, ARP, ICMP, UDP messages with improper Ethernet 
padding per susceptible host (see Table IV). 
Because each TCP and ICMP messages padding is 6 
bytes long, ARP message padding 18 bytes, the average 
steganographic bandwidth is about 32 bit/s (with a daily 
standard deviation of about 14 bit/s). Therefore, if the 
hidden node generates Ethernet frames with improper 
padding that fall within the average range, for the inspected 
LAN network, steganographic communication may remain 
undetected. 
 
 
TABLE IV.   THE NUMBER OF FRAMES WITH IMPROPER PADDING PER 
HOST 
 
TABLE V.  ESTIMATED STEGANOGRAPHIC BANDWIDTH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. PadSteg prototype  
PadSteg prototype – StegTalk – was implemented in 
C/C++ programming language with use of WinPcap 4.1.1 
library (www.winpcap.org) for Windows XP OS. StegTalk 
is limited in functioning to ARP protocol only, so the PID 
value (see Fig. 8) is constant and equal 2. Application 
allows sending and receiving content from *.txt files 
between program instances running on different hosts. 
StegTalk behavior is not deterministic in time. Messages 
containing steganograms are sent every ~60 seconds 
(depending on initial command line arguments) and 
initialization messages every 180 seconds, imitating host 
with Windows XP OS behavior. The ~60 seconds interval 
Prot. Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
TCP 25,379 53,469 31,014 79,981 52,940 
ARP 1,036 250 2,116 2,828 1,825 
ICMP 618 1,330 1,154 1,660 9 
UDP 31 117 65 1,773 77 
[bit/s] TCP ARP ICMP Sum 
Average steg. 
bandwidth 26.98 3.43 1.90 32.31 
Standard 
deviation 12.03 1.15 0.66 13.84 
Confidence 
Interval (95%) 5.41 0.52 0.30 6.23 
was estimated in the following way. Based on experimental 
results presented in Table V maximum steganographic 
throughput that sustains high undetectability level, using 
ARP protocol is ~4 bit/s. It means that a single ARP 
message is issued every ~45 seconds. However, because 
initialization ARP messages are sent every 180 seconds, 
therefore, messages containing actual data should be sent 
every ~60 seconds.  
Exemplary StegTalk output and functioning is presented 
in Fig. 10. Hidden host received ARP message and 
discovered new hidden node (1). Then host sent its own 
advertisement ARP message with steganographic 
capabilities (2). Every ARP message that hash was not 
successfully recognized is ignored (3). Each ARP message 
which is received from known hidden node is verified and 
hidden data is extracted (“topsecretmessage”) (4). 
 
 
Figure 10. StegTalk application functioning 
 
StegTalk tests were conducted on two virtual PC’s with 
use of VMware Server 2.0 (www.vmware.com). Fixed-size 
text was sent from one host to another three times for each 
application mode (maximizing undetectability --slow or 
throughput --fast, see Fig. 11), in order to measure the time 
needed to receive the full text. Measured goodput 
(application level throughput) was approx. 2.3 bit/s and 
depending on program initial command line arguments it 
varied between 1.7 bit/s and 2.5 bit/s (standard deviation 
approx. 0.2 bit/s).  
 
 
Figure 11. StegTalk application arguments 
Having tested StegTalk behavior, in order to estimate 
application undetectability, sample host’s network traffic 
had to be profiled – Fig. 12. Generally, application 
generates significantly fewer messages than the host during 
each 24h period. It is worth noting that the total amount of 
ARP messages will be a sum of those generated by host and 
StegTalk. Editing Windows OS registry keys may decrease 
the amount of ARP messages send by host and would 
increase StegTalk undetectability.  
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Figure 12. No. of ARP messages generated each day by an 
exemplary host and StegTalk application 
 
VI. POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES 
Our proposal of the new steganographic system, PadSteg, 
proves that such phenomenon like inter-protocol 
steganography is possible and may pose a threat to network 
security.  
In today’s LANs, with security measures they provide, 
PadSteg will be hard to detect. The main reason for this is 
that current IDS/IPS (Intrusion Detection/Prevention 
System) systems are rarely used to analyze all traffic 
generated in a LAN as this would be hard to achieve from 
the performance point of view. Moreover, usually 
IDSs/IPSs operate on signatures, therefore they require 
continuous signatures updates of the previously unknown 
steganographic methods, especially, if the information 
hiding process is distributed over more than one network 
protocol (as it is in PadSteg).  
Thus, the best steps we can take to alleviate PadSteg in 
LANs are to: 
• Ensure that there are no NICs with Etherleak 
vulnerability in the LAN. 
• Enhance IDS/IPS rules to include PadSteg and deploy 
them in LANs. 
• Improve access devices (e.g. switches) by adding 
active warden functionality [7] i.e. ability to modify 
(set to zeros) Ethernet frame padding if an improper 
one is encountered. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 Implementation of the specified countermeasures greatly 
minimizes the risk of successful PadSteg utilization. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we presented new steganographic system - 
PadSteg – which is the first information hiding solution 
based on inter-protocol steganography.  
It may be deployed in LANs and it utilizes two protocols 
to enable secret data exchange: Ethernet and ARP/TCP. A 
steganogram is inserted into Ethernet frame padding but one 
must always "look" at the other layer protocol (ARP or 
TCP) to determine whether it contains secret data or not. 
Based on the results of conducted experiment the average 
steganographic bandwidth of PadSteg was roughly 
estimated to be 32 bit/s. It is a quite significant number 
considering other known steganographic methods. 
In order to minimize the potential threat of inter-protocol 
steganography to public security identification of such 
methods is important. Equally crucial is the development of 
effective countermeasures. This requires an in-depth 
understanding of the functionality of network protocols and 
the ways in which they can be used for steganography. 
However, considering the complexity of network 
protocols being currently used, there is not much hope that a 
universal and effective steganalysis method can be 
developed. Thus, after each new steganographic method is 
identified, security systems must be adapted to the new, 
potential threat.  
As a future work larger volumes of traffic from different 
LANs should be analyzed in order to pinpoint more 
accurately PadSteg feasibility and calculate its 
steganographic bandwidth. 
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